Many Questions and a Few Answers: Freedom of Association after Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, Mounted Police Association of Ontario and Meredith by Dunn, Michael S.
The Supreme Court Law
Review: Osgoode’s Annual
Constitutional Cases
Conference
Volume 71 (2015) Article 15
Many Questions and a Few Answers: Freedom of
Association after Saskatchewan Federation of
Labour, Mounted Police Association of Ontario
and Meredith
Michael S. Dunn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works
4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Supreme
Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Dunn, Michael S.. "Many Questions and a Few Answers: Freedom of Association after Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, Mounted
Police Association of Ontario and Meredith." The Supreme Court Law Review: Osgoode’s Annual Constitutional Cases Conference 71.
(2015).
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/sclr/vol71/iss1/15
 Many Questions and a Few Answers: 
Freedom of Association after 
Saskatchewan Federation of Labour, 
Mounted Police Association of  
Ontario and Meredith 
Michael S. Dunn* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada has radically altered the 
landscape of Canadian law in the area of labour relations. The Court’s 
decision in Health Services and Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining 
Assn. v. British Columbia1 reversed 20 years of jurisprudence by holding 
that the section 2(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 
protection of freedom of association includes a right to collectively bargain. 
The Court held that violations of section 2(d) could be established where 
government unilaterally alters existing collective agreements in relation to 
important workplace issues, or precludes future bargaining on such issues. 
The scope of the section 2(d) right was somewhat narrowed in  
                                                                                                                                  
*  Counsel in the Constitutional Law Branch of the Ministry of the Attorney General for 
Ontario. The author was counsel on Mounted Police Association of Ontario v. Canada and Meredith 
v. Canada, discussed below. The views expressed herein reflect only the author’s views, and do not 
reflect the views of the Ministry of the Attorney General or the Government of Ontario. I am deeply 
indebted to Justice Robert E. Charney, Robin K. Basu, Rochelle S. Fox and Sarah Wright for our 
thought-provoking discussions on the scope of the right protected by s. 2(d) of the Charter, and to 
Matthew Horner for kindly agreeing to read a draft of this article on very short notice. Of course, any 
mistakes are my own. 
1  [2007] S.C.J. No. 27, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Health Services”]. The 
Court overruled the so-called “labour trilogy” of Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act 
(Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) (“Alberta Reference”); Public Service 
Alliance of Canada v. Canada, [1987] S.C.J. No. 9, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.) and Retail, Wholesale 
and Department Store Union v. Saskatchewan, [1987] S.C.J. No. 8, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460 (S.C.C.). 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
386 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2015) 71 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser,3 when the Court upheld a statutory 
labour relations regime that lacked most of the features commonly 
associated with Canadian labour codes.  
Perhaps recognizing the difficulty in reconciling these cases, the Court 
has now attempted to clarify the scope of section 2(d). In Mounted Police 
Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General)4 the Court struck down 
federal legislation limiting the ability of RCMP members to form 
independent employee associations, and described the right to collectively 
bargain in sweeping terms. In Saskatchewan v. Saskatchewan Federation  
of Labour,5 the Court recognized a right to strike, again reversing  
long-standing precedent. These two decisions can be seen as a departure 
from Fraser, back towards the broader conception of section 2(d) found in 
Health Services. At the same time, the Court in Meredith v. Canada 
(Attorney General)6 dismissed a constitutional challenge brought by RCMP 
employees whose agreement in respect of wages was unilaterally set aside. 
The Court found it unnecessary to resort to section 1, finding no violation 
of section 2(d). 
The purpose of this article is to trace the development of the Court’s 
section 2(d) jurisprudence, beginning with the seeds of a right to 
collectively bargain in Dunmore; the recognition of a right to collectively 
bargain in Health Services; the narrowing in Fraser, where the Court held 
that section 2(d) does not guarantee a particular model of labour relations; 
and the broadening of the right in SFL and MPAO. While it would appear 
that the Court has moved back towards Health Services, the eventual 
outcome of the issues raised by what I will call the 2015 trilogy is, at this 
point, far from certain. This is particularly so in relation to the legislative 
imposition of significant terms in collective agreements (the issue in 
Meredith), as well as the scope of the right to strike protected by SFL.  
II. THE ROAD TO HEALTH SERVICES — DUNMORE V. ONTARIO 
Although it was not obvious at the time, the decision in Dunmore v. 
Ontario (Attorney General)7 marked a significant step towards Health 
Services and beyond. Dunmore arose out of the enactment of the  
                                                                                                                                  
3  [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Fraser”]. 
4  [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “MPAO”]. 
5  [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “SFL”]. 
6  [2015] S.C.J. No. 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Meredith”]. 
7  [2001] S.C.J. No. 87, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”]. 
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Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, 1995 
(“LRESLAA”).8 The LRESLAA in turn repealed the Agricultural Labour 
Relations Act, 1994,9 which granted statutory protection to the labour 
relations activities of farm workers, who had previously always been 
excluded from statutory labour regimes.10 
This decision recognized a constitutional right to statutory 
associational rights for agricultural workers. Presumably because the 
Supreme Court had repeatedly rejected claims that section 2(d) protected 
a right to collectively bargain, the claimants challenged the legislation as 
restricting the “wider ambit of union purposes and activities”, such as the 
social and political activities undertaken by unions. Although Dunmore 
was cited in Health Services for the proposition that it opened the door to 
protecting collective bargaining under section 2(d),11 the Dunmore Court 
noted that the Court had repeatedly held that no such protection existed.12 
On the facts in Dunmore, the Court accepted that there was a positive 
obligation on the state to ensure that agricultural workers had the freedom 
to organize. As the Court put it, “exclusion from a protective regime may 
in some contexts amount to an affirmative interference with the effective 
exercise of a protected freedom”.13 This conclusion may be supportable on 
the facts of Dunmore, although it has caused significant analytical 
difficulty in subsequent cases. Unlike the case of Delisle,14 where RCMP 
officers were unable to show that they could not associate without being 
included in a statutory bargaining regime, the workers in Dunmore had an 
evidentiary record to support their claims.  
The Court in Dunmore accepted that, without inclusion in some 
statutory regime, the claimants would be unable to exercise their 
constitutional right to associate — that is, to form or join a union. It should 
                                                                                                                                  
8  S.O. 1996, c. 1. 
9  S.O. 1994, c. 6. 
10  Dunmore, supra, note 7, at para. 2. 
11  Health Services, supra, note 1, at paras. 31-35. 
12  Dunmore, supra, note 7, at para. 17. 
13  Id., at para. 22. The Court set out three conditions that had to be met before a claim of 
underinclusion could successfully be made. First, the claim must be grounded in a fundamental 
freedom, rather than access to a particular statutory regime. Second, a proper evidentiary foundation 
must exist — it is not enough that the claimant can show that they seek access to a particular regime. 
Presumably, the claimant must show that access to at least some regime is necessary for the exercise 
of the right. Third, the state must be truly accountable for the inability to exercise the fundamental 
freedom: Dunmore, id., at paras. 22-26. 
14  Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 
(S.C.C.). In Delisle, which will be discussed further below in relation to MPAO, the Court rejected a 
challenge by RCMP officers to a right to a process of collective bargaining. 
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be noted that the Court, in so finding, accepted that the claimants could 
establish a breach of section 2(d) if they were not able to associate for their 
desired purpose (that is labour relations). The workers were not prevented 
from associating for purposes unrelated to labour relations and collective 
bargaining. Although the Court does not say so explicitly, underlying its 
conclusion is an acceptance that the purposes of associations in the labour 
context, or at the very least the core right to organize, should receive 
protection under section 2(d).  
III. HEALTH SERVICES AND FRASER 
Much has been written about the Court’s decisions in Health 
Services and Fraser, and I do not want to repeat it all here.15 Nor is the 
purpose of this article to argue that the Court was wrong or right in 
Health Services to recognize a right to collective bargaining under 
section 2(d). However, a review of these cases is required in order to 
understand where we find ourselves today, as some of the key problems 
that I identify in the 2015 trilogy have their origins in these cases.  
1.  Health Services (2007) 
 Health Services arose out of a reorganization of the health care 
sector in British Columbia. The government was of the view (and this 
was not seriously challenged in the Supreme Court) that both demand for 
and costs of health care had escalated, and that the province was 
struggling to fund the costs of the system. The province enacted the 
Health and Social Services Delivery Improvement Act16 in response. The 
Act gave health care sector employers significantly more flexibility in 
labour relations matters. In particular, the Act introduced changes to 
transfers and multi-worksite assignment rights, contracting out, the status  
 
                                                                                                                                  
15  See, only by way of example, B. Langille, “The Freedom of Association Mess: How We 
Got into It and How We Can Get out of It” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 177; B. Oliphant, “Exiting the 
Freedom of Association Labyrinth: Resurrecting the Parallel Liberty Standard under 2(d) & Saving 
the Freedom to Strike” (2012) 70:2 U.T. Fac. L. Rev. 36; R.E. Charney, “The Contract Clause 
Comes to Canada: The British Columbia Health Services Case and the Sanctity of Collective 
Agreements” (2007/2008) 23 N.J.C.L. 65; R.K. Basu, “Revolution and Aftermath: B.C. Health 
Services and Its Implications” (2008) 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 165; J. Cameron, “The Labour Trilogy’s Last 
Rites: B.C. Health and a Constitutional Right to Strike” (2009-2010) 15 C.L.E.L.J. 297. 
16  S.B.C. 2002, c. 2.  
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of employees under contracting out arrangements, job security programs, 
and lay-off and bumping rights. Importantly, the Act permitted employers 
to reorganize in respect of these issues in ways that would not have been 
permitted under existing collective agreements, and explicitly provided 
that the Act prevailed over existing agreements. Future bargaining on 
issues covered by the Act was prohibited.17  
A group of affected unions challenged the Act under section 2(d) of 
the Charter. At both trial and appellate level, the British Columbia courts 
were unwilling to find that collective bargaining was protected by section 2(d), 
and accepted that the law on this point was unchanged by Dunmore. The 
Supreme Court itself, however, decided that this case presented an 
opportunity to revisit this issue. The Court articulated four reasons for 
concluding that section 2(d) protects a right to collective bargaining:  
First, a review of the s. 2(d) jurisprudence of this Court reveals that the 
reasons evoked in the past for holding that the guarantee of freedom of 
association does not extend to collective bargaining can no longer 
stand. Second, an interpretation of s. 2(d) that precludes collective 
bargaining from its ambit is inconsistent with Canada’s historic 
recognition of the importance of collective bargaining to freedom of 
association. Third, collective bargaining is an integral component of 
freedom of association in international law, which may inform the 
interpretation of Charter guarantees. Finally, interpreting s. 2(d) as 
including a right to collective bargaining is consistent with, and indeed, 
promotes, other Charter rights, freedoms and values.18 
The most relevant of these for the purposes of this article are the first and 
second. It is these two that the Court uses to elevate the right to associate 
in the labour relations context (the fact that, in my view, underlies the 
Court’s decision in Dunmore) into a distinct category from other 
associational rights, where the purposes of the association are themselves 
protected by section 2(d).  
The Court started by reviewing the Court’s prior decisions rejecting a 
right to collectively bargain. The underlying theme of this analysis was to 
elevate the dissenting reasons of Dickson C.J.C. in the Alberta Reference19 
into somewhat of a guide to the Court’s approach to section 2(d).  
                                                                                                                                  
17  Health Services, supra, note 1, at paras. 8-12 contains an overview of the legislation; 
more detailed discussions of the changes can be found at paras. 116-128. 
18  Health Services, id., at para. 20. 
19  Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] S.C.J. No. 10, 
[1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.). 
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A secondary theme that emerges from both Health Services and 
subsequent cases is the idea that, while collective bargaining (and other 
associational rights in the labour context) are heavily regulated by statute, 
they are not “creations” of statute. This gave the Court a reason to avoid its 
previous admonition that labour policy, including how to balance the rights 
of employees and employers, was an area best left to the legislatures. The 
Court did not explicitly distance itself from this proposition, but instead 
held that “worker organizations historically had the right to bargain 
collectively outside statutory regimes”, and that “[p]olicy itself should 
reflect Charter rights and values.”20 
The Court held that the prior decisions had taken a “decontextualized” 
approach to the section 2(d) right. By this, the Court meant that the prior 
case law had failed to account for the difference between labour unions 
and other associations. As the Court wrote:  
The generic approach of the earlier decisions to s. 2(d) ignored 
differences between organizations. Whatever the organization — be it 
trade union or book club — its freedoms were treated as identical. The 
unfortunate effect was to overlook the importance of collective 
bargaining — both historically and currently — to the exercise of 
freedom of association in labour relations.21 
This, to my mind, is the logical corollary of Dunmore. The Court finds 
here that labour unions are different than book clubs from the perspective 
of the type of protections that section 2(d) provides. Presumably, both 
have the right to form associations (a law prohibiting book clubs would 
be as vulnerable to challenge as a law prohibiting unions), but the 
Court’s view of the historical importance of labour unions means that 
they receive greater protections for the activities that are fundamental to 
their existence. This reasoning supports both the recognition of a right to 
collectively bargain in Health Services, and a right to strike as 
recognized in SFL. 
Although I view Health Services as flowing in some ways from 
Dunmore, the way the Court reasons to this conclusion lacks coherence. 
It is worth quoting paragraph 35 in its entirety to make this point:  
Bastarache J. reconciled the holding in Dunmore of a positive 
obligation on government to permit farm workers to join together to 
bargain collectively in an effective manner with the conclusion in 
                                                                                                                                  
20  Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 26. 
21  Id., at para. 30. 
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Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989, that 
the federal government was not under a positive obligation to provide 
RCMP officers with access to collective bargaining by distinguishing 
the effects of the legislation in the two cases. Unlike the RCMP 
members in Delisle, farm workers faced barriers that made them 
substantially incapable of exercising their right to form associations 
outside the statutory framework (per Bastarache J., at paras. 39, 41 and 
48). The principle affirmed was clear: Government measures that 
substantially interfere with the ability of individuals to associate with a 
view to promoting work-related interests violate the guarantee of 
freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.22 
The Court in Dunmore certainly affirmed that measures that 
“substantially interfere” with the ability of individuals to associate (in the 
labour context, to organize into a union) could violate section 2(d). As 
the Dunmore Court said, “the freedom to organize constitutes a unique 
swatch in Canada’s constitutional fabric, as difficult to exercise as it is 
fundamental, into which legislative protection is historically woven”.23  
However, the second proposition (that measures interfere with the 
ability of workers to associate for the purpose of promoting work-related 
interests) amounts to a significant extension of Dunmore. While it is true 
that one of the purposes of associating with others in the labour context 
is a desire to engage in collective bargaining, the Court in Dunmore 
attempted to draw a distinction between a right to organize and the right 
to collectively bargain. There was no question in Dunmore that the 
agricultural workers had a section 2(d) right to associate — the only 
question was whether they were entitled to a regime of labour relations 
that would allow them to fully exercise this right. The Court in Health 
Services ignores the particular context of Dunmore, where the record 
showed that the agricultural workers were substantially incapable of 
exercising their right to organize in the absence of statutory protections.  
In any event, the Court in Health Services was willing to extend 
section 2(d) to include a right to collectively bargain. As it would later do 
with the right to strike, the Court emphasized in Health Services that 
collective bargaining has a fundamental place in the history of Canadian 
labour relations, and emphasized its role in the dominant Wagner Act 
                                                                                                                                  
22  Id., at para. 35 (italics in original; underlining added). 
23  Dunmore, supra, note 7, at para. 35 (emphasis added). 
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model of labour relations.24 The Court also cited a number of 
international law sources for the proposition that the right to collectively 
bargain forms part of a right to associate, and held that the protection of 
collective bargaining accords with other Charter values such as human 
dignity, liberty, autonomy and enhancing democracy.25  
Having articulated a rationale in support of the decision to recognize 
a right to collectively bargain under section 2(d), the Court then 
attempted to define the contours of the right. The Court, presumably still 
mindful of the complexity of labour policy, sought to give guidance 
without being overly prescriptive. The Court defined the right as a right 
to a process of collective bargaining. The right therefore does not include 
a right to a particular outcome. However, while the Court insisted that no 
outcome was guaranteed, the Court also held that unilateral government 
interference with specific outcomes could amount to a violation of 
section 2(d). If unilaterally nullifying the results of a process of 
collective bargaining has the effect of rendering the previous bargaining 
meaningless, then a violation of the right may be established.26 
The question as framed by the Court was first, whether the matter 
affected was sufficiently important to the process of collective bargaining 
as to be brought within the protections of section 2(d). Unilateral 
governmental interference in matters of little import27 is less likely to 
give rise to a section 2(d) violation. Even if the matter is sufficiently 
important, the Court will ask whether the interference by government is 
sufficiently serious as to give rise to a violation of section 2(d). In 
defining this threshold, the Court again referred to the duty to bargain in 
good faith, holding that the right is to a process of good faith consultation 
and discussion, with the parties having an obligation to come together 
and seek an agreement in good faith.28  
On the facts of Health Services itself, the Court found that the issues 
of contracting out, layoffs and bumping dealt with matters of sufficient 
importance to the unions that unilaterally removing the employees’ say in 
                                                                                                                                  
24  See Health Services, supra, note 1, at paras. 56-63, where the Court discusses the dominant 
model of labour relations in North America, which is modelled on the 1935 National Labor Relations Act 
(U.S.), commonly referred to as the Wagner Act after its sponsor Senator Robert Wagner. 
25  Health Services, id., at paras. 80-86.  
26  Id., at para. 96. 
27  The Court gave the examples of uniform design, the layout and organization of cafeterias, 
or the location or availability of parking lots as matters unlikely to be sufficiently important: Health 
Services, id., at para. 96. 
28  Health Services, id., at paras. 100-106. 
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these matters violated the right to a process of collective bargaining. 
However, the Court found that interference with provisions related to 
transfers and reassignments were not sufficiently serious. In the Court’s 
view, these were “relatively minor modifications to in-place schemes for 
transferring and reassigning employees. Significant protections remained 
in place”.29 
A few things were clear from the decision in Health Services. First, 
government action was required. That is, either government must enact 
legislation (that unilaterally determines which matters may be subject to 
negotiation or specifies terms of agreements), or act as employer. 
Although the Court did not avert to this factor explicitly, it surely had an 
impact on the analysis that the employers in Health Services were 
delivering public services. The government’s rationale for the changes to 
the process of collective bargaining had less to do with government 
policy with respect to labour relations, and more to do with an attempt to 
rationalize the health care sector in an effort to improve the delivery of 
these health care services. The Court also noted that at least part of the 
government objective was to save costs.30 Whether or not these were the 
true goals, or sufficiently important to justify a limit on the section 2(d) 
Charter right, is not important for the purpose of this article. The point is 
that the government was attempting to reform an area of society for 
which it had direct responsibility, rather than mediating between two 
private interests. As we will see in the Fraser case, the Court did not 
come to the same conclusion when addressing private sector bargaining.  
Second, the Court was at pains to note that it was not guaranteeing a 
right to a particular process of collective bargaining or a particular model 
of labour relations: 
… as the right is to a process, it does not guarantee a certain substantive 
or economic outcome. Moreover, the right is to a general process of 
collective bargaining, not to a particular model of labour relations, nor 
to a specific bargaining method. As P.A. Gall notes, it is impossible to 
predict with certainty that the present model of labour relations will 
necessarily prevail in 50 or even 20 years.31 
The Court was seeking to distance itself from an argument that it was 
essentially constitutionalizing the Wagner Act, notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                                                  
29  Id., at paras. 130-131. 
30  Id., at paras. 143-147. 
31  Id., at para. 91, citation omitted. 
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extensive reference to the Wagner Act and concepts such as good faith 
bargaining. While this makes eminent sense, the difficulty for courts and 
lawyers after Health Services remained that the Wagner Act model was 
the foundation of much of what the Court had said in Health Services.32  
2.  Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser (2011) 
In Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser,33 the Supreme Court 
revisited Health Services. Because of the eventual conclusions of the 
Court in the 2015 trilogy, I will address in some detail the reasons of the 
Court of Appeal in this case, as they appear to underlie at least part of the 
reasoning in the 2015 trilogy.  
The Ontario legislature responded to Dunmore with the Agricultural 
Employees Protection Act (“AEPA”).34 The AEPA continued to exclude 
farm workers from the Labour Relations Act, 199535 applicable to most 
employees in Ontario, but extended certain statutory rights to agricultural 
workers. In particular, they were given the right to form and join 
employees’ associations, make representations to their employers through 
their associations on the terms and conditions of their employment, and not 
to be subject to interference, coercion or discrimination in respect of the 
exercise of these rights. The employer had a duty to listen to these 
representations and read them. Finally, a Tribunal was tasked with 
determining certain disputes under the Act.  
Unions seeking to represent employees in the agricultural sector 
challenged the AEPA under section 2(d) of the Charter.36 Justice Farley 
rendered his decision in 2006, prior to Health Services.37 Relying upon 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Dunmore and earlier cases, he dismissed 
the constitutional challenge on the basis that section 2(d) did not protect 
                                                                                                                                  
32  There are a number of other troubling aspects to the decision in Health Services that are 
beyond the scope of this article. For example, the Court’s s. 1 analysis refers to the fact that there 
was no consultation with the affected unions prior to introducing the legislation in question. 
Consideration of this as a factor under s. 1 would appear to be at odds with the Court’s affirmation, 
two paragraphs earlier, that “Legislators are not bound to consult with affected parties before passing 
legislation.” See paras. 159-160, 157. 
33  Fraser, supra, note 3. 
34  S.O. 2002, c. 16. 
35  S.O. 1995, c. 1, Sch. A. 
36  Like in Dunmore and Health Services, the legislation was also challenged pursuant to s. 15(1) 
of the Charter.  
37  [2006] O.J. No. 45, 79 O.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Fraser SCJ”]. 
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a right to collectively bargain.38 There was nothing in the AEPA that 
prevented a union from organizing agricultural workers into an employee 
association, which was what he viewed as the core protection granted by 
Dunmore. As summarized by the Supreme Court, he held that the 
statutory protections:  
… confer the power to organize (s. 1); protection against denial of 
access to property (s. 7); protection against employer interference with 
trade union activity (s. 8); protection against discrimination (s. 9); 
protection against intimidation and coercion (s. 10); protection against 
alteration of working conditions during the certification process (ss. 9-10); 
protection against coercion of witnesses (s. 10); and removal of Board 
notices (s. 10).39 
In a finding that would be significant in the Supreme Court, Farley J. 
held that the unions had not given the Tribunal the opportunity to address 
any alleged abuses under the Act.40 
The Court of Appeal, applying Health Services, found a violation of 
section 2(d) that was not saved under section 1. The Court of Appeal, per 
Winkler C.J.O., held that the claimants had not established that the AEPA 
failed to protect their right to organize.41 However, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that the AEPA was constitutionally infirm in that it did not 
protect a right to collectively bargain. As the Court said:  
If legislation is to provide for meaningful collective bargaining, it must 
go further than simply stating the principle and must include provisions 
that ensure that the right can be realized. At a minimum, the following 
statutory protections are required to enable agricultural workers to 
exercise their right to bargain collectively in a meaningful way: (1) a 
statutory duty to bargain in good faith; (2) statutory recognition of the 
principles of exclusivity and majoritarianism; and (3) a statutory 
mechanism for resolving bargaining impasses and disputes regarding 
the interpretation or administration of collective agreements.42 
Chief Justice Winkler’s reasons in support of each principle were 
cogent, assuming that a right to collectively bargain is protected by 
section 2(d). For example, with respect to the duty to bargain in good 
                                                                                                                                  
38  Id., at para. 29. 
39  Fraser, supra, note 3, at para. 14. 
40  Fraser SCJ, supra, note 37, at para. 28. 
41  [2008] O.J. No. 4543, 2008 ONCA 760, at paras. 98-100 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Fraser 
OCA”]. 
42  Id., at para. 80. 
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faith, there was ample language in Health Services itself that supported 
this conclusion:  
 The state “must not substantially interfere with the ability of a union 
to exert meaningful influence over working conditions through a 
process of collective bargaining conducted in accordance with the 
duty to bargain in good faith”.43  
 The state must “preserve a process of consultation and good faith 
negotiation”.44 
 The duty to negotiate in good faith “lies at the heart of collective 
bargaining”.45 
On the subject of dispute resolution, Winkler C.J.O. was of the view 
that “the bargaining process is jeopardized if the parties have nothing to 
which they can resort in the face of fruitless bargaining”, and that there 
must also be a process to resolve disputes as to the interpretation of the 
agreement, as “[i]f an employer is able to unilaterally interpret the 
agreement that results from bargaining, that bargaining might as well 
have never occurred.”46  
This was not raised directly in Health Services, but certainly flowed as 
a logical corollary. If section 2(d) could be breached where government 
unilaterally took certain issues off the bargaining table, surely the same 
could be true where the Court had already held that the exercise of the 
section 2(d) right would be frustrated without statutory protection, and the 
statute provided no dispute resolution mechanism. How, otherwise, would 
the employees ensure that their right to engage in “meaningful” collective 
bargaining was not frustrated? 
Chief Justice Winkler concluded that majoritarian exclusivity47 was 
also constitutionally required, having regard to similar factors employed 
by the Supreme Court in recognizing a right to collective bargaining. 
Majoritarian exclusivity has historically been a part of Canadian labour 
relations. He also accepted that exclusivity furthers the Charter values of 
                                                                                                                                  
43  Health Services, supra, note 1, at para. 90. 
44  Id., at para. 94. 
45  Id., at paras. 98-107. 
46  Fraser OCA, supra, note 41, at paras. 82-83. 
47  Majoritarian exclusivity refers to the system of labour relations whereby once a trade 
union has acquired bargaining rights for a particular bargaining unit, it has exclusive representational 
rights for all members of that unit, whether or not they are members of that union. See Fraser OCA, 
id., at paras. 86-90. 
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granting employees an effective voice in negotiating with their employers. 
Finally, exclusivity has been shown to be both workable and fair for 
employees and employers. It ensured that employers would negotiate with 
the employees, and not have to negotiate with an unlimited number of 
potentially competing organizations.48 
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court was deeply 
divided on the issue, but a five-judge majority found no violation of 
section 2(d).49 Notwithstanding the ringing endorsement of a right to 
collective bargaining in Health Services, the Court now described the 
right to a process of collective bargaining as “derivative” of the right to 
associate:  
… what s. 2(d) protects is the right to associate to achieve collective 
goals. Laws or government action that make it impossible to achieve 
collective goals have the effect of limiting freedom of association, by 
making it pointless. It is in this derivative sense that s. 2(d) protects a 
right to collective bargaining … . However, no particular type of 
bargaining is protected. In every case, the question is whether the 
impugned law or state action has the effect of making it impossible to 
act collectively to achieve workplace goals.50 
In the majority’s view, Health Services did not require that the 
legislature provide any of the elements described by the Court of Appeal. 
So long as the AEPA provided agricultural workers with a process 
through which they could make representations to their employers on 
important workplace issues, and the employers were required to listen to 
those representations in good faith, no violation of section 2(d) would be 
found. The Court was willing to read into the AEPA a requirement that 
the employer listen to the representations in good faith, and held that the 
claimants had not attempted to make use of the Tribunal process 
established by the AEPA.51  
This conception of the right to collectively bargain was much closer to 
Dunmore than Health Services. It appeared to recognize that the core of 
the section 2(d) right is an ability to come together in association. In the 
labour context, that most obviously includes a right to organize. Although  
                                                                                                                                  
48  Fraser OCA, id., at paras. 87-93.  
49  Justice Rothstein (Charron J., concurring) held in a lengthy concurrence that the Ontario 
Court of Appeal had correctly interpreted Health Services, but that Health Services should be 
overruled. Justice Abella dissented, and would have upheld the Ontario Court of Appeal. Justice 
Deschamps would have restored the decision of Farley J., for separate reasons. 
50  Fraser, supra, note 3, at para. 46. 
51  Id., at paras. 109-112. 
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I think that this is closer to a consistent reading of the section 2(d) right  
(in that it does not favour particular types of organizations), it is not 
consistent with the recognition of a constitutional right to collectively 
bargain in Health Services. 
3.  Irreconcilable Differences — Health Services and Fraser in the 
Courts, 2011-2015 
In the wake of Fraser, Canadian courts were presented with two 
decisions that were very difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, Health 
Services affirmed that section 2(d) protected a right to collectively 
bargain. On the other hand, when dealing with a vulnerable category of 
workers in Fraser, the Court held that the full panoply of Wagner Act 
protections was not constitutionally required.  
Predictably, this resulted in inconsistent decisions. Some cases 
matched up nicely with Health Services, in the sense that they involved 
challenges to the structure of collective bargaining in various sectors of the 
economy. Thus, in CSN c. Québec (Procureur général), the trial judge 
struck down a law providing for the reorganization of Quebec’s social 
services sector, which legislatively determined certain bargaining units, 
and made other amendments to the negotiation process for these 
employees.52 In Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan,53 
the Court of Queen’s Bench recognized a right to strike. In Mounted Police 
Assn. v. Canada,54 the Ontario Superior Court found that the labour relations 
regime applicable to RCMP officers breached section 2(d). 
A second category of these cases involved trial level challenges to 
expenditure restraint legislation enacted by the federal government in the 
wake of the 2008 financial crisis. For example, the Superior Court of 
Justice in Ontario found that lawyers working for the federal Department 
of Justice had established a breach of section 2(d) because the Expenditure 
Restraint Act55 prevented meaningful negotiation over salaries.56 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                  
52  [2007] J.Q. no 13421, [2008] R.J.D.T. 87 (Que. S.C.), revd [2011] J.Q. no. 8444, 2011 
QCCA 1247 (Que. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 424 (S.C.C.). 
53  [2012] S.J. No. 49, 2012 SKQB 62 (Sask. Q.B.), revd [2013] S.J. No. 235, 2013 SKCA 43 
(Sask. C.A.), revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.). 
54  [2009] O.J. No. 1352, 96 O.R. (3d) 20 (Ont. S.C.J.), revd [2012] O.J. No. 2420, 2012 
ONCA 363 (Ont. C.A.), revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
55  S.C. 2009 c. 2, s. 393. 
56  Association of Justice Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] O.J. No. 4873, 108 O.R. 
(3d) 516 (Ont. S.C.J.), revd [2012] O.J. No. 3710, 2012 ONCA 530 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal 
refused [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 430 (S.C.C.) (discussed infra).  
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in Association des réalisateurs c. Canada (Procureur général)57 the Quebec 
Superior Court held that provisions of the Expenditure Restraint Act that 
overrode wage terms of pre-existing collective agreements between the 
CBC and two unions and prevented further negotiation on wages for  
the period of the legislation violated section 2(d). On the other hand, the 
British Columbia Supreme Court held in Dockyard Trades that no 
infringement occurred when the Expenditure Restraint Act set aside an 
arbitral award, as the arbitration provisions were not the result of a process 
of collective bargaining.58 In Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General),59 the 
trial division of the Federal Court found that the Expenditure Restraint Act 
infringed the rights of RCMP officers when it set aside a previously 
agreed-to pay increase. 
With the exception of Dockyard Trades, violations of section 2(d) 
were found where the government was found to have set aside important 
terms of collective agreements, or rendered bargaining on these issues 
meaningless by taking particular issues off the table. This would appear 
to be exactly the situation contemplated by Health Services.  
However, after Fraser, Courts of Appeal generally came to the 
opposite conclusion. Thus in Association of Justice Counsel, the Ontario 
Court of Appeal found that no section 2(d) violation had been established, 
as the parties had been able to engage in a lengthy process of collective 
bargaining prior to the Expenditure Restraint Act coming into force.60 In 
Dockyard Trades, the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that no 
section 2(d) violation had been established. Although the cancellation of a 
wage increase was important to the workers, it did not nullify other aspects 
of the collective bargaining relationship, and permitted future bargaining 
                                                                                                                                  
57  [2012] J.Q. no 6770, 2012 QCCS 3223 (Que. S.C.), revd [2014] J.Q. no 4930, 2014 
QCCA 1068 (Que. C.A.), application for leave to appeal remanded [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 351 
(S.C.C.) (discussed infra). 
58  Federal Government Dockyard Trades and Labour Council v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2011] B.C.J. No. 1697, 2011 BCSC 1210 (B.C.S.C.), affd [2013] B.C.J. No. 1802, 2013 
BCCA 371 (B.C.C.A.), application for leave to appeal remanded [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 404 (S.C.C.) 
(discussed infra). The trial judge’s decision that the constitutional analysis depends entirely on 
whether the agreement was a result of arbitration instead of a process of negotiation was specifically 
rejected by the Court of Appeal, although the Court of Appeal agreed in the result. Having regard to 
the fact that the process of collective bargaining available to the workers in Dockyard Trades 
included arbitration, it seems to me that little if anything should turn on the question of whether the 
award was the result of negotiation only, or negotiation followed by arbitration.  
59  [2011] F.C.J. No. 948, 2011 FC 735 (F.C.), revd [2013] F.C.J. No. 465, 2013 FCA 112 
(F.C.A.), affd [2015] S.C.J. No. 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 125 (S.C.C.). 
60  [2012] O.J. No. 3710, at para. 41, 2012 ONCA 530 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused 
[2012] S.C.C.A. No. 430 (S.C.C.).  
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on this and other issues.61 And in Meredith, the Federal Court of Appeal 
found no violation of section 2(d), as the RCMP officers were still able to 
act collectively to achieve workplace goals.62  
Governments also successfully defended claims that did not involve 
expenditure restraint after Fraser. The Quebec Court of Appeal found no 
section 2(d) violation with respect to the reorganization of bargaining 
units in CSN v. Québec.63 The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that 
section 2(d) did not protect a right to strike in Saskatchewan Federation 
of Labour v. Saskatchewan, although part of that decision can be 
explained by that court’s respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.64 And in 
Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that 
the officers had not established a substantial interference with their 
ability to associate.65 
Prior to 2015, it therefore seemed that the courts had retreated from 
an expansive view of the right to collectively bargain, and that a claimant 
would have to show that the state action interfering with collective 
bargaining made it effectively impossible to associate.  
IV. THE NEW TRILOGY 
This all changed again in 2015, when the Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to address three of the cases discussed above: Saskatchewan 
Federation of Labour, where the Court recognized a constitutional right 
to strike; Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. Canada, where the Court 
effectively overruled Delisle and struck down the labour relations regime 
applicable to RCMP officers; and Meredith v. Canada, where the Court 
found that expenditure restraint legislation did not infringe the section 2(d) 
rights of RCMP officers (and did not require section 1 justification). 
                                                                                                                                  
61  [2013] B.C.J. No. 1802, at paras. 52-54, 2013 BCCA 371 (B.C.C.A.). 
62  [2013] F.C.J. No. 465, 2013 FCA 112 (F.C.A.), affd [2015] S.C.J. No. 2, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 
125 (S.C.C.). 
63  [2014] J.Q. no 4930, 2014 QCCA 1068 (Que. C.A.), application for leave to appeal 
remanded [2015] S.C.C.A. No. 351 (S.C.C.). 
64  [2013] S.J. No. 235, 2013 SKCA 43 (Sask. C.A.), revd [2015] S.C.J. No. 4, [2015] 1 
S.C.R. 245 (S.C.C.). 
65  [2012] O.J. No. 2420, at paras. 119-120, 2012 ONCA 363 (Ont. C.A.), revd [2015] S.C.J. 
No. 1, [2015] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
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1.  Mounted Police Assn. of Ontario v. Canada (Attorney General) 
(“MPAO”) 
In MPAO, the Court had its first opportunity since Health Services to 
consider a challenge to the labour relations regime applicable to a segment 
of the public sector. It was also the Court’s first chance to consider and 
attempt to reconcile Health Services and Fraser. While not overruling 
Fraser, the Court appears to have limited its scope in important ways.  
RCMP officers have always been excluded from collective 
bargaining under the Public Service Labour Relations Act66 and its 
predecessors. Indeed, the evidence showed that the purpose of excluding 
the RCMP officers from collective bargaining was to make it more 
difficult for them to associate, so as to avoid a concern about “divided 
loyalties”.67 Instead, the RCMP had put in place a separate employee 
relations regime for RCMP officers, the Staff Relations Representative 
Program (“SRRP”). This program was not independent of the command 
structure of the RCMP, but did make representations to management on 
workplace issues. In the Court’s view, however, the SRRP was more 
accurately described as “an internal human relations scheme imposed on 
RCMP members by management”.68 
RCMP members had formed voluntary associations (including the 
Mounted Police Association of Ontario). These organizations had 
unsuccessfully challenged their exclusion from the PSLRA in Delisle. 
After Health Services, the same organizations again challenged the 
SRRP. As noted above, the Associations were successful at the trial level, 
but were unsuccessful on appeal. 
The Supreme Court in MPAO held that the exclusion of RCMP 
officers from the PSLRA, and the imposition of the SRRP, infringed 
section 2(d) in both purpose69 and effect. The Court had little trouble 
concluding that the effect of the SRRP was to undermine collective 
bargaining, and found an infringement of section 2(d) on this basis. Of 
particular concern to the Court was the SRRP’s lack of independence 
                                                                                                                                  
66  S.C. 2003 c. 22, s. 2 [hereinafter “PSLRA”]. 
67  MPAO, supra, note 4, at paras. 17-21. This history is canvassed in Delisle v. Canada 
(Deputy Attorney General), [1999] S.C.J. No. 43, at paras. 92-107, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 989 (S.C.C.), per 
Iacobucci and Cory JJ., dissenting. 
68  MPAO, supra, note 4, at para. 118. 
69  The purpose of excluding officers from organizing had the express goal of preventing the 
officers from associating for the purpose of engaging in collective bargaining. The imposition of the 
SRRP was therefore invalid on this basis alone: MPAO, id., at para. 110. 
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from RCMP management.70 The Court found that these infringements 
were not justified under section 1. In my view, this reasoning rested 
largely on the Court’s conclusion that there was no good reason to 
exclude police officers from collective bargaining, having regard to the 
fact that other police services engage in collective bargaining.71 
The Court could likely have concluded that the SRRP did not 
sufficiently ensure a process of collective bargaining based on Health 
Services and Fraser. There was certainly an argument that the 
associations could meet the Fraser requirement that it was “effectively 
impossible” for the employees to associate for the purpose of engaging in 
collective bargaining because of the lack of independence from 
management. However, the Court instead took this opportunity to again 
review at length the nature of the section 2(d) protection of collective 
bargaining. The Court explicitly distanced itself from Fraser in two 
ways. First, the test for infringement is not whether government action 
makes it effectively impossible to associate; rather, the claimant must 
show that government action substantially interferes with freedom of 
association.72 Second, the right to collectively bargain is not “derivative” 
of the right to associate; it is a necessary precondition to the meaningful 
exercise of this right.73 It would be preferable if the Court explicitly 
overturned Fraser on these points rather than indicating that it was 
clarifying Fraser. For example, it would appear obvious (as pointed out 
by Rothstein J. in dissent in MPAO) that the Court in Fraser chose the 
words “effective impossibility” with care.74  
In any event, the rights protected under the approach advocated by 
the Court were summarized as: 
… (1) the right to join with others and form associations; (2) the right 
to join with others in the pursuit of other constitutional rights; and  
                                                                                                                                  
70  MPAO, id., at paras. 116-118. Although the Court considered both the purpose and effect 
of the imposition of the SRRP, it considered only the purpose of the exclusion from the PSLRA. 
This distinction seems arbitrary, given that, as the Court found, the imposition of the SRRP operated 
in tandem with the exclusion from the PSLRA to prevent the members from engaging in meaningful 
collective bargaining. One explanation for this seeming inconsistency may be that the Court was 
being cautious in not finding that the effect of the exclusion from the PSLRA was to infringe s. 2(d), 
so as to not give the impression that the result of this case is the mandatory inclusion of RCMP 
officers in the PSLRA. See para. 137. 
71  MPAO, id., at para. 147; see also MPAO (Ont. S.C.J.), supra, note 56, at paras. 95-98, 
finding that the RCMP is the only police force in Canada without a collective agreement. 
72  MPAO, supra, note 4, at paras. 74-75. 
73  MPAO, id., at paras. 78-79. 
74  MPAO, id., at paras. 213-217, per Rothstein J., dissenting. 
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(3) the right to join with others to meet on more equal terms the power 
and strength of other groups or entities.75 
In order to give meaning to these rights, employees must have access to a 
meaningful process of labour relations that allows them to pursue 
workplace goals in concert. According to the Court, the “essential features” 
of such a process are choice and independence. In the case of choice, the 
basic question is whether employees have sufficient input into the selection 
of their collective goals.76 Not only must employees have choice, their 
associations must be independent of management. The degree of 
independence required is that the interests of the association must align 
with the interests of the membership.77 
2.  Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v. Saskatchewan 
In the wake of a number of public sector strikes, Saskatchewan 
enacted the Public Service Essential Services Act78 (“PSESA”) and  
the Trade Union Amendment Act, 2008.79 The PSESA required public 
employers and unions to negotiate an essential services agreement, and 
prohibited any “essential services employee” from participating in a work 
stoppage against their employer. Both “essential services” and “public 
employer” were broadly defined. Employers could unilaterally determine 
who should be designated as an essential services employee, in the event 
that no agreement was reached. The Labour Relations Board had a limited 
power to review the number of employees required to work in a particular 
classification during a strike, but had no power “to review whether any 
particular service is essential, which classifications involve the delivery of 
genuinely essential services, or whether specific employees named by the 
employer to work during the strike have been reasonably selected”.80 
As I have already noted, the Court of Queen’s Bench had found that 
the PSESA infringed section 2(d) of the Charter, on the basis that Health 
Services supported a right to strike.81 The Court of Appeal allowed the 
                                                                                                                                  
75  MPAO, id., at para. 66. 
76  MPAO, id., at paras. 85-87. 
77  MPAO, id., at para. 88. 
78  S.S. 2008, c. P-42.2. 
79  S.S. 2008, c. 26. 
80  SFL, supra, note 5, at para. 13.  
81  [2012] S.J. No. 49, 2012 SKQB 62 (Sask. Q.B.). The trial judge dismissed the challenge 
to the Trade Union Amendment Act, which introduced changes to the certification and decertification 
processes and permitted broader employer communication to employees. See paras. 223-279. 
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government appeal, holding that the Supreme Court had not yet reversed 
its previous jurisprudence rejecting a constitutional right to strike. 
However, it is worth noting that the Court of Appeal was also alive to a 
potential issue flowing from the case. As the Court noted, “workers have 
always had the root capacity to collectively down their tools in an effort 
to extract concessions from their employers”.82 What was sought in this 
litigation was not the “pre-statutory” right, as the Court of Appeal called 
it, but rather the modern right to strike as it generally exists in Canadian 
labour relations statutes:  
… SFL and the unions do not wish to return to a world where 
employees can withdraw their labour in concert, but where employers 
are not obliged to recognize unions, where union representation is 
based on something other than exclusive majoritarianism, where 
employers are not required to bargain, or to bargain in good faith, 
where employees who participate in strikes can be dismissed for breach 
of their employment contracts and so forth. The reality is that, in the 
year 2013, the “right to strike” which SFL and the unions seek to 
protect is deeply integrated into, and in many ways can be seen as a 
function of, a specific statutory system.83 
In the Supreme Court, the majority was willing to overlook these 
potential issues, and recognize the right to strike in sweeping terms. 
Undertaking an analysis similar to that in Health Services, the Court 
looked to the legal history of strike action, its centrality to the Wagner 
Act model and internationally, and its “crucial role in a meaningful 
process of collective bargaining”. The test in each case will be “whether 
the legislative interference with the right to strike in a particular case 
amounts to a substantial interference with collective bargaining”.84 On the 
facts of this case, the Court found that the PSESA infringed section 2(d), 
as the employees were prohibited from engaging in any work stoppage as 
part of a bargaining process. Interestingly, the majority was of the view 
that alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (such as binding 
arbitration) should be considered under section 1, rather than as part of 
the section 2(d) analysis.85  
                                                                                                                                  
82  [2013] S.J. No. 235, at para. 62, 2013 SKCA 43 (Sask. C.A.). 
83  Id., at para. 63. 
84  SFL, supra, note 5, at para. 78. 
85  SFL, id., at para. 60. Again, the Court referred approvingly to the dissent of Dickson C.J.C. 
in the Alberta Reference, supra, note 1, on this point. 
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On the question of section 1, the Court accepted that the provision of 
“essential services” was pressing and substantial, and that the legislation 
met the rational connection test.86 However, it was not minimally 
impairing, as there was no evidence that unilateral decision-making (as 
opposed to a collaborative model) was required. Further, any employee 
designated as “essential” would have to perform non-essential work in 
addition to the truly essential work.87 Finally, the lack of access to an 
impartial dispute resolution mechanism was fatal to the government 
argument, as the Court was of the view that it left the employees without 
any means to counter the bargaining power of the employer.88  
3.  Meredith v. Canada (Attorney General) 
The final case in the 2015 trilogy is an odd fit. Unlike MPAO and 
SFL, Meredith did not involve a challenge to a model of labour relations 
imposed by government. Rather, it was the first (and so far only)89 case 
arising out of the Expenditure Restraint Act to reach the Supreme Court.  
Recall that Meredith was brought by RCMP officers who were 
members of the SRRP. They claimed that Treasury Board’s decision to 
set aside a scheduled wage increase for their members violated section 2(d), 
and argued that pursuant to Health Services, this amounted to the 
unilateral nullification of an important term of a collective agreement. 
The case was heard together with MPAO, although the issues raised were 
very different. On the one hand, MPAO challenged the structure under 
which employees made representations, in which the claimants argued 
that the entire SRRP was unconstitutional. On the other hand, Meredith 
was a challenge where the participants in the SRRP wished to protect 
what they viewed as the fruits of that process. The main thing they had in 
common was that both involved RCMP officers. 
Having found the SRRP process unconstitutional in MPAO, the Court 
in Meredith nonetheless held that the SRRP process could attract Charter 
protection.90 As the Court put it, the question was whether the Expenditure 
                                                                                                                                  
86  SFL, id., at para. 79. 
87  SFL, id., at paras. 90-91. 
88  SFL, id., at paras. 92-95. 
89  Leave to appeal was refused in the Association of Justice Counsel case discussed, supra, 
note 56: [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 430 (S.C.C.). 
90  Meredith, supra, note 6, at para. 4. 
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Restraint Act “substantially interfered with the existing Pay Council 
process, so as to infringe the appellants’ freedom of association”.91 
Although the Expenditure Restraint Act had the effect of setting aside 
a scheduled wage increase that had been accepted by Treasury Board, the 
Court found no violation of section 2(d). It appears that three factors 
underlay this conclusion: first, unlike in Health Services, where the 
legislation radically altered significant terms of collective agreements, 
the Act capped wages at the “going rate” achieved in other federal 
agreements, thus reflecting an outcome consistent with actual bargaining 
processes (although not, of course, the bargaining process engaged in by 
the claimants). Further, the claimants were able to consult on other 
compensation related matters, either past or future.92 Finally, the Act left 
room for the RCMP members to negotiate additional allowances, and the 
record showed that they had successfully done so.93 
As I argue below, Meredith is hard to reconcile with MPAO and SFL, 
as the Court spends only three paragraphs discussing why the 
Expenditure Restraint Act did not infringe section 2(d).  
V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2015 TRILOGY 
1.  MPAO and SFL: More Questions than Answers? 
 SFL and MPAO make a certain amount of sense when read together. 
In MPAO, the Court articulates an expansive view of section 2(d) that 
protects the ability of employees to come together, and to even the 
playing field as between employees and employers. A right to strike, as 
the key economic weapon available to employees in a bargaining 
process, fits with this view of section 2(d).  
One question left open by SFL is the nature of the section 2(d) right 
to strike. As pointed out by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, the right 
to strike sought in SFL is not merely the right to withdraw services in 
concert. It would seem obvious that section 2(d) protects this right, since 
this is basically a right not to be compelled to work. Limitations on an 
employee’s right to withdraw services would require justification under 
section 1, presumably in a situation where serious harm would result 
                                                                                                                                  
91  Id., at para. 25. 
92  Id., at para. 28. 
93  Id., at para. 29. 
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from an immediate withdrawal of services. In the case before the Court, 
essential services employees were prohibited from engaging in any work 
stoppage, upon penalty of conviction. The Court could therefore have 
held that the scope of the right to strike was limited to cases such as SFL 
itself, where employees are prohibited from ceasing to work.94 
It is, however, quite different to say that the constitutional right to 
strike includes the statutory protections typically offered in modern 
labour relations statutes (including the important right not to have the 
employer treat the fact of a strike as an abandonment or breach of the 
employment relationship).95 The Court is certainly correct when it finds 
in SFL that strikes long pre-date the enactment of statutory labour 
relations regimes.96 While strikes themselves may be fairly characterized 
as existing prior to their regulation by labour relations statutes, it is much 
more difficult to argue that the statutory protections for employees 
engaged in a strike fall into the same category. The Court’s failure to 
draw this particular distinction (between a right to withdraw services in 
concert, and the right to do so with certain minimum protections) leaves 
a great deal of undesirable uncertainty for both unions and employers. If 
the Court were recognizing only a limited right to withdraw services, it 
would be better to say so. Such an approach would reconcile SFL with 
Fraser, where striking was neither protected nor prohibited by the 
legislation upheld by the Court. 
A second question is the extent of the latitude left by the Court in 
terms of limits on the right to strike. The Wagner Act model itself 
imposes significant limits on the right to strike, including voting 
requirements, timing requirements, and restrictions on the conduct of a 
strike itself. Do these all require justification under section 1? I think that 
the answer is likely “no”, given what I see as the Court’s preference for 
the Wagner Act model in recent cases. The Court has also left the door 
open when it finds that the PSESA infringes section 2(d) “because it 
prevents designated employees from engaging in any work stoppage as 
part of the bargaining process”.97 The Court does not answer the question 
of whether or not legislation that prevents employees from engaging in 
                                                                                                                                  
94  PSESA, s. 20; Trade Union Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. T-17, s. (1)(k.1) (“strike”) (repealed and 
replaced by Saskatchewan Employment Act, S.S. 2013, c. S-15.1). 
95  See, e.g., Labour Relations Act, 1995, S.O. 1995 c. 1, Sch. A, s. 1(2): “For the purposes 
of this Act, no person shall be deemed to have ceased to be an employee by reason only of the 
person’s ceasing to work for the person’s employer as the result of a lock-out or strike … .”  
96  SFL, supra, note 5, at paras. 38-41.  
97  Id., at para. 78 (emphasis in original). 
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“many” work stoppages, or limits the times when these work stoppages 
may occur (i.e., every Canadian labour relations statute) also infringe 
section 2(d) and require justification.  
The Court’s emphasis in MPAO on independence from management 
is understandable, and I take no issue with this part of the Court’s 
reasoning. However, I have more difficulty with the Court’s use of 
“choice” as a touchstone for section 2(d). In the typical Wagner Act 
model, one aspect of choice is the ability of employees to be able to 
decertify their union.98 However, the Court also comments favourably on 
the “designated bargaining model” in place in Ontario’s education sector, 
where employees choose their representatives, but their bargaining agent 
is designated by statute.99 The Court comments that these employees 
retain control over the selection of workplace goals, although they lack 
some of the other choices available in the Wagner Act model. However, 
the Court also says later that, “If employees cannot choose the voice that 
speaks on their behalf, that voice is unlikely to speak up for their 
interests. It is precisely employee choice of representative that guarantees 
a representative voice.”100 In MPAO itself, the members of the RCMP 
were able to elect the SRRs, although they (like others in designated 
bargaining regimes) lack the ability to “to join associations that are of 
their choosing and independent of management, to advance their 
interests”.101 If “choice” only means that employee representatives must 
be able to determine which goals are the most important, these sentences 
are unnecessary and create further uncertainty. 
The Court’s approach to minority or dissenting union members is 
also unclear. For example, the respondents in MPAO argued that a broad 
view of section 2(d) would require an employer to recognize and bargain 
with any association of employees. The Court responded that: 
Freedom of association requires, among other things, that no 
government process can substantially interfere with the autonomy of 
employees in creating or joining associations of their own choosing, 
even if in so doing they displace an existing association. It also requires 
that the employer consider employees’ representations in good faith, 
and engage in meaningful discussion with them. But s. 2(d) does not 
                                                                                                                                  
98  As recognized by the Court in MPAO, supra, note 4, at para. 94. 
99  MPAO, id., at para. 95. 
100  Id., at para. 101. 
101  Id., at para. 112 (emphasis added); see also the trial decision of MacDonnell J. for a 
discussion of the election and organization of the SRRP: MPAO (Ont. S.C.J.), supra, note 56, at 
paras. 14-19, 28-31. 
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require a process whereby every association will ultimately gain the 
recognition it seeks … . As we said, s. 2(d) can also accommodate a 
model based on majoritarianism and exclusivity (such as the Wagner 
Act model) that imposes restrictions on individual rights to pursue 
collective goals.102  
The Court avoids the question of whether the government employer  
(1) may listen to the representations of only the majority employee group; 
or (2) must listen to representations from all groups (in the sense that 
employees wishing to associate with a minority union also have rights 
under section 2(d) that must be respected); or (3) is prohibited from 
entertaining these representations (because of the principle of majoritarian 
exclusivity). The Court says in MPAO that majoritarian exclusivity passes 
constitutional muster, but what of the other two options? Do they require 
section 1 justification? 
It seems to me to be no answer to say that a minority association “may 
not gain the recognition it seeks”. If the right to associate for the purpose 
of collectively bargaining is a constitutional right that exists independent 
of labour statutes, these employees would also have section 2(d) rights to 
collectively bargain and have their representations considered in good 
faith. The Court could have held that, while the Wagner Act model may 
infringe on these employees’ rights to collectively bargain, such an 
infringement is justified under section 1. But it did not do so. The 
conclusion that only those employees represented by the majority 
bargaining unit have a right to associate and have their representations 
considered in good faith does not accord with the Court’s other recent 
pronouncements on section 2(d). Presumably, the Court will have to 
address this issue in coming cases.  
Finally, what are we to make of the negative aspect of section 2(d)? 
The Court has previously held that section 2(d) protects a right not to 
associate.103 However, the Court has also rejected claims that section 2(d) 
is violated by virtue of the fact that even non-members of a union may be 
required to pay dues to the union, on the theory that these members also 
get the benefit of the activities of the union. Is there a right not to 
collectively bargain? The right not to associate was decided in a legal 
landscape where there was no constitutional right to collectively bargain, 
                                                                                                                                  
102  MPAO, id., at para. 98. 
103  Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, [1991] S.C.J. No. 52, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 
211 (S.C.C.); R. v. Advance Cutting & Coring Ltd., [2001] S.C.J. No. 68, 2001 SCC 70 (S.C.C.); 
Bernard v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] S.C.J. No. 13, at paras. 37-39, 2014 SCC 13 (S.C.C.). 
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and no constitutional right to strike. If those employees have a 
constitutional right not to associate with their fellow employees, and the 
Court has now recognized a right to collectively bargain as equally 
important to the right to association, should not dissenting employees also 
have the right not to collectively bargain? Put differently, if the right to 
come together and bargain collectively is so fundamental to the section 2(d) 
right, and it was sufficiently important that some employees not be 
required to join unions that a right not to associate found protection in the 
Charter, should not the right of dissenting employees not to collectively 
bargain also find constitutional protection? These issues were not raised by 
the 2015 trilogy, and these cases provide little guidance on whether the 
Supreme Court would be willing to take this next step. 
2. Expenditure Restraint Cases — What about Meredith? 
I have left this issue to the end, as it is the most difficult to reconcile 
with the existing case law. On the one hand, the Court has affirmed that 
section 2(d) protects both a right to strike, and a right to engage in a 
process of collective bargaining through an independent representative 
chosen by the employees. However, when a group of employees who 
have no right to strike actually reach an agreement, and that agreement is 
unilaterally set aside, the Court finds no violation of section 2(d), in part 
based on agreements reached with other bargaining agents.  
One way to attempt to reconcile these cases is to focus on the 
difference between substance and outcome. While the Court has taken the 
opportunity to provide constitutional protection to elements of the Wagner 
Act model, it may be that it remains hesitant about guaranteeing the 
substantive outcomes of collective bargaining. This issue was not really 
raised in Health Services, since the Court was able to say that it was 
providing a process through which the employees could negotiate. The 
parties were then encouraged to go back and bargain. It is, perhaps, quite a 
different matter to actually provide a constitutional guarantee that the 
outcome of a particular process may not be set aside without justification.  
Of course, the Court in Meredith did not have to confront the extent 
to which legislatively overriding the fruits of the SRRP might impact on 
future bargaining under the SRRP. Having struck down the SRRP in 
MPAO, the Court did not need to inquire as to whether future bargaining 
under the SRRP could still be meaningful in light of its conclusion in 
Meredith.  
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The same is not true for the other Expenditure Restraint Act cases, 
where the courts will have to consider the effect, if any, of the Act in 
respect of ongoing collective bargaining relationships. Shortly after the 
release of Meredith and MPAO, the Court remitted Dockyard Trades and 
Association des réalisateurs for disposition in accordance with Meredith 
and MPAO. On its face, this is somewhat surprising, as the Expenditure 
Restraint Act was upheld in Meredith, and also in both Court of Appeal 
cases. The fact that these two cases (as well as a pending challenge 
brought in the Ontario Court of Appeal104) will be reheard in the Courts 
of Appeal suggests that the extent to which government may impose 
expenditure restraint without infringing section 2(d), or whether such 
restraint may be justified, remains a live issue.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
It will be clear by this point that I have significant difficulty with the 
analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in the 2015 trilogy. In my 
view, by protecting such a broad conception of a right to collectively 
bargain, the Court is inevitably weighing in on matters of labour policy. 
The question of what other models that deviate from the Wagner Act may 
be constitutionally acceptable will have to be determined. Similarly, the 
extent to which setting aside agreed-upon collective agreements interferes 
with section 2(d) will require the Court to confront head on the issues  
it avoided in Meredith, requiring the Court to consider the extent to 
which any such interference may be justified under section 1, and on 
what basis.  
                                                                                                                                  
104  This case involves a challenge by the Professional Institute of the Public Service of 
Canada and the Public Service Alliance of Canada to the Expenditure Restraint Act. The 
constitutional challenge was dismissed by Lederer J. (Professional Institute of the Public Service of 
Canada v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 732, 2014 ONSC 965 (Ont. S.C.J.)), but the 
appeal was put on hold pending the outcome of Meredith and MPAO.  
  
